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THE ANALYSIS OF CATEGORICAL PROPOSITIONS.
I THIHK I ought to restate my difficulty about Miss Jones's New
Law of Thought, as a note upon it has appeared in MIND.
It is, in a word, that the analysis which is plausible for such a
proposition as " My first penitent was a murderer " seems to be
offered as adequate for " The three angles of every triangle are
equal to two right angles ". Granting for the sake of argument
that the first proposition really means that the same individual
possessed the two attributes specified, can we suppose that the
second proposition means no more than that in the same individual
triangles we find three angles, and also equality of the angles to two
right angles ? Miss Jones is willing, as I understand, to admit that
there can be inseparability of intensions, but is not willing to admit
that the proposition can primarily affirm it. It involves, she points
ont, identity of denotation. But this goes no way to show that identity
of denotation is what in such a proposition we want to affirm. It
is a question of the very nature and meaning of Science, which
consists in affirming laws of connexions of attributes. I cited the
' Story from Thackeray " just to show how very far from a scien-
tific connexion it is possible for an inference from individual identity
to be.
As there is a verbal difference from Miss Jones's view in the
passage ?he cites from Mr. Bradley, it may be worth while to point
out another which simply and clearly puts her doctrine in its right
place. " Every judgment makes a double affirmation, or a single
affirmation which has two sides. It asserts a connexion of different
attributes, with an indirect reference to an identical subject; or u
directly asserts the identity of the subject, with an implication
of the difference of its attributes. If you prefer to consider the
identity of the subject; . . . you read the judgment in extension.
If again you emphasise the connexion of the differences, you take
the judgment intensionally." ' What is here given as the exten-
sional rendering is I think precisely Miss Jones's account of the
judgment. The difference is that the intensional rendering, which
takes the judgment as a connexion of attributes, is treated as the
necessary and fundamental interpretation. This appears from the
whole argument. Here is the " restriction " under which I said
that Miss Jones's view had been stated by previous writers. And
my criticism 13 that the restriction is obviously sound.
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The heading of this note, in which I follow Miss Jones, formally
confines the problem to categorical propositions. If this were to
be understood of snob propositions only as have for their subject
an individual or colleotion of individuals, Miss Jones's analysis
would prima facie cover the ground. But I have offered this
eirenicon in my Logic, and I understand that it is not accepted.
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